The modern synthesis of genetics with evolution slanted our understanding of evolution and of ourselves by rejecting Darwin's view of animals as participating in their own evolution. Defining evolution in terms of genetics, the modern synthesis indulges excessive individualism and distorted self-images as self-made. At the same time such gene-centered thought, evoking images of master molecules making us who we are, hollows out volition and so also moral concerns and political alternatives. Drawing on the geography of thought, we argue that stubbornly tacit preformationist biological thought reflects and anchors social processes that limit adaptability in reaching toward sustainable living. We appeal for leveraging sustainability efforts by affirming in theory and in the public square an open image of human nature that recognises the participation of our ancestors in becoming who we are, obliging people to make their history together. Achieving the collective self-regulation sustainability requires may depend on correcting slanted reasoning about ourselves.
Introduction
In his appeal for a more open image of humanity Kenneth Bock recalled Circe magically turning Ulysses' men into animals, lifting from their shoulders the more acute self-consciousness and moral challenges of being human. In a turn of Homer's original plot, Gelli (1549) required Ulysses to convince his men to choose becoming human again, but his arguments 'about the refinements of human life and the superiority of human understanding or intellect carry little weight against rejoinders concerning the dire results of people's incontinent indulgence in luxury and the absurdities into which they have been led by their finely honed but tortuous reasoning' (Bock 1994, 17) . Taking up these questions and drawing on geographies of thought and boundary crossings, we argue that stubbornly tacit preformationist biological thought reflects and anchors social processes that limit adaptability in reaching toward sustainable living. These implications for sustainability underscore the importance of human geography's engagement with contemporary life sciences (Castree 2009 ) and the urgent need for 'conversation about our "species being"' (Harvey 2000, 207) .
Participating in evolution
With varying degrees of emphasis Darwin recognized behaviour, use and disuse, as a causal factor in evolution. In Darwin's view (1964 Darwin's view ( [1859 , 134-36), insects' use or disuse of their wings on windswept islands, where they are 'frequently blown to sea and perish', were part of the natural selection of enlarged or reduced wing sizes in successful fliers and successful if 'indolent' walkers, respectively. The ostrich's defensive use of its legs and disuse of its wings played some part in the selection of a large, flightless bird. For Darwin, insects and ostriches participated in their own evolution.
In On the Origin of Species, Darwin (1964 [1859 , 134-137, 143, 206, 447, 479 ) invoked use and disuse in 'long-continued' time frames, not one generation to the next, and as 'quite compatible with', 'aided by', 'aiding' or 'largely combined with, and sometimes overmastered by' natural selection. And he consistently used the term "acquired" with reference to species, not individuals, across longer time frames, not one generation to the next, and often with explicit reference to selection processes. Yet Huxley (1960, 14, 20) and other prominent contributors to the modern synthesis considered Darwin's references to use and disuse 'Lamarckian errors', chalked up to 19 th century ignorance of genetics. They presented use and disuse as an alternative to 'blind'
and 'automatic' natural selection, not as part of the selection process.
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Evaluated only in terms of direct genetic inheritance, one generation to the next, of "acquired characteristics", adaptations within the lives of animals were 'rendered obsolete' in evolutionary theory and 'exposed … as sins against
Occum's razor' (Lerner 1959, 173 1967, 6) or 'evolutionary inventions' (Grant 1998, 313) , dodging the specter of intention while using the language of intention.
This bashfulness about behaviour reflects a causal privileging of genes and environments over the competent participation of organisms in their own development and evolution. Biological thought has long relied on tacit appreciation of this competence while explicitly minimising or neglecting it.
Oyama (2000b, 336) describes several ways reasoning has been bent to this end by the intuitive appeal of a 'homunculoid gene'. Traits are called "innate" or "acquired" based on analysis of variance, which is not the same as analysis of organisms (Lewontin 1974) . While interacting only with other intracellular molecules, genes are said to "interact" with culture, humans being products of this "interaction", not semiautonomous participants mediating and to some extent shaping it. Both similarities and differences across species are interpreted as indicating innateness, incest avoidance considered innate in humans because it is seen in other animals, language considered innate because it is not. To
Oyama's list, we would add the common misapprehension that genetic causes of disease reflect the degree to which genes specify health. In biology, agency is more comfortably ascribed at the scale of genes than of organisms.
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This causal privileging has been challenged repeatedly over the years.
Gullick (1905, iv) observed that 'members of the same species, exposed to the same environment in isolated groups, will often arrive at different methods of dealing with the environment, and so subject themselves to divergent forms of selection '. Waddington (1960, 401) it is simpling, after which much progress in science is filling in gaps of its own making.
With genes, environments and chance in the driver seat, organisms are to be explained and not heard. Though zebra finch singing induces gene expression This theoretical bias against organisms as participants in their own evolution has been shaped in part by biologists' denial of their own participation in understanding life.
'The achievements which form the subject matter of biology can be identified only by a kind of appraisal which requires a higher degree of participation by the observer in his subject matter than can be mediated by the tests of physics and chemistry. The current ideal of "scientificality" which would refuse such participation would indeed destroy biology but for the wise neglect of consistency on the part of its supporters' (Polanyi 1957, 482) .
5
Also biasing theory against recognizing participation in evolution have been practical and conceptual difficulties in studying behaviour, genes providing more convenient "handles" (Gannett 1999); confusing science's pragmatic exclusion of purpose with the conclusion that purpose is not real, 
Crossing boundaries
Transitions across boundaries underscore the role of animal behaviour in evolution. Evolutionary changes commonly attributed to changing environments, including changes associated with colonisation and understood as "ecological release", are often initiated and mediated by animals' activities.
Innovative foraging behaviours are major determinants of successful colonisation of novel environments (Sol et al. 2002; 2005a) , granting some birds the power to stay, while others are obliged to migrate (Sol et al. 2005b) . This is one way behaviour drives speciation and may explain why behavioural flexibility is associated with higher rates of speciation (Sol et al. 2005c) .
Colonisation events reveal the participation of organisms in changing their environments and consequent changes in behaviour and morphology.
Conspicuously but not uniquely on islands, whose significance here stems more from their boundaries than their isolation (Greenhough 2006), these biogeographical processes indicate that behaviour 'may be a potent force in driving evolution in novel directions', while sometimes actually reducing the likelihood of genetic change (Price et al. 2003 (Price et al. , 1433 6 .
Price (2008) adaptability by which humans made geographic boundaries more permeable, deferring the usual biological constraints on island dominants while rendering islandness less distinctive in human geography (Cliff et al. 2000) .
Geography of biological thought
The geography of thought casts light on evolutionary theory's entanglement in Beyond feeding and provisioning ourselves, biological thought affects prospects for sustainability because the sense we make of ourselves shapes who we become, including our capacities for learning, cooperation and selfregulation. "Knowing" that intelligence is fixed inhibits learning (Blackwell et al. 2007) . "Knowing" that personality attributes are inherited impels hasty 
Conclusion
Sailing the Mediterranean, Ulysses would have seen 'abundant monk seal, loggerhead turtles and porpoises' (Roberts 2007, 375) . Not today. The 'juggernaut, improvement' has rolled over habitation (Polanyi 2001, 191) , fraying the weave of life. Meanwhile, the modern synthesis of genetics with evolution has been more committed to simpling man into causal theories than stretching theories to include the purposeful behaviour of man and other animals. Human inventiveness, regarded by the modern synthesis as the evolutionary consequence of climate variability (Potts 1996) , has begun causing climate variability.
To take full account of insects, ostriches or humanity, biology must recognize the participation of animals in their own development and evolution.
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More is at stake than a robust theory of evolution. Because sustainability is as much about managing ourselves and each other as managing resources, the sense we make of ourselves can limit or leverage sustainability achievements.
Biology's neglect of consistency regarding intention and participation, drolly conceded by Haldane and seeming wise when Polanyi diagnosed it over a half century ago, is no longer wise.
Mayr 's (1959, 13) claim that 'the very survival of man on this globe may depend on a correct understanding of the evolutionary forces and their application to man' must be understood in light of Waddington's (1960; cf. Lewontin 2000) view of man and other animals as both objects, to which evolutionary forces apply, and subjects, themselves evolutionary forces.
Recognising our ancestors and ourselves as participants in evolution is vital to sustainability aspirations, as it animates healthful consideration of the responsibilities that come with our deft inventiveness. Theory that hollows out volition diminishes responsibility.
Awkwardly appended declarations of responsibility are poor substitutes for baking it into the theoretical cake. Simpson's (1960; 973) is one of many such declarations in which it is unclear how people's 'sense of responsibility' ensues from an evolutionary process in which 'the mechanism of orientation, the nonrandom element' is 'blind' natural selection. Vermeij (2010, 250) 
